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Abstract: This paper examines the effects of environmental zoning policies on lakefront 
land development, sorting, and economic welfare in a model where agents are 
heterogeneous in preferences and income.  Agents consume lakefront amenities that are 
endogenous to development and the sorting process yields lakes which differ by 
amenities and frontage prices.  Our findings include the following: i) lakes become more 
homogeneous with a collapsing price premium as incomes grow, ii) zoning can preserve 
the sorting process and be welfare improving, and iii) land prices may not capture all 
welfare effects from zoning. 
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The process of land development can affect human welfare in a variety of ways.  
First, there are direct effects because the density of landscape development—or lack 
thereof—directly affects utility.  Second, land development indirectly affects human 
welfare via its effect on the provision of ecological goods and services such as wildlife 
habitat.  In response, a variety of land use policies have been proposed to control land 
development, including policies such as minimum lot size zoning, tradable development 
rights, and riparian buffer zones.  An implication of growth controls is that they provide a 
signal to heterogeneous agents about the future state of the landscape.  What is often 
overlooked is that agents can use this signal to sort themselves across a landscape in such 
a way as to generate heterogeneous ecological outcomes.  Therefore, growth controls can 
influence human welfare directly through landscape pattern and indirectly through the 
ecological outcomes that arise due to the sorting process. 
In this paper we examine the effects of environmental zoning policies on lakefront 
land development, sorting, and economic welfare in a model where agents are 
heterogeneous in preferences and income. While our focus is on lakefront zoning, the 
results are generally applicable to other types of zoning. The paper begins with an 
analytic framework in which heterogeneous individuals consume lakefront amenities that 
are endogenous to lakefront development. We show that both with and without zoning, in 
equilibrium agents sort themselves across lakes that differ in amenity levels and frontage 
prices.  Agents who value environmental amenities most highly end up on relatively 
undeveloped, high-priced lakes.  However, in the absence of zoning, there are too many 
heavily developed, low-priced lakes, and the relatively undeveloped, high-priced lakes 
  2are not as undeveloped as they should be, because of the externality effects associated 
with development.  
We then explore the sorting equilibrium in a world where development is 
dynamic and irreversible.  Initially, only a subset of the population –the “lake-loving 
rich” –resides on the lake system in the sorting equilibrium.  We consider the case of 
increasing incomes over time, which make the lake system more attractive and feasible to 
the mass of agents with average incomes and average tastes.  We demonstrate that in the 
absence of land use controls, the population residing on the lake system becomes more 
homogeneous –the high-amenity and low amenity lakes converge—with a reduced price 
premium on the high amenity lake and a potentially lower level of amenities. The 
increasingly homogeneous lakefront population can drive the lake system to a common 
state of environmental degradation.  
We use simulations to examine potential sorting outcomes associated with 
heterogeneous zoning.  Our results show that zoning policies can preserve sorting across 
the lake system.  This has implications for the ecological steady-state of the lake system; 
not only does zoning directly result in less development on some lakes, but it influences 
the type of individual purchasing lakeshore property –that is, the individual’s preference 
for the ecological goods and services provided by the lakeshore.  In other words, by 
preserving agent sorting, environmental zoning induces differential social-ecological 
feedbacks across the lake system. Lakes dominated by agents with high amenity 
preferences are unlikely to evolve ecologically to the same state as lakes dominated by 
agents with lower amenity preferences.  
  3In terms of welfare implications, our results show that zoning can be welfare-
enhancing, although the distribution of welfare gains varies across landlords and residents 
who occupy lakefront property.  While landlords can capture land rent from 
environmental zoning policies, our results demonstrate that residents can simultaneously 
lose welfare, with the characteristics of the population determining the distribution of 
welfare gains and losses.  One implication of this finding is that land prices may not 
capture all welfare effects of environmental zoning. 
This paper complements the body of literature regarding agent sorting across 
communities that differ in taxes and public services (e.g. Tiebout 1955; Hamilton 1976; 
Epple et al. 1993; Wheaton 1993; Epple and Sieg 1999). Most of the sorting literature 
assumes that community-specific amenities are exogenous (Epple and Sieg 1999; Sieg et 
al. 2004) and find that the sorting process results in high-amenity communities having 
high housing prices.  Moreover, the previous literature is primarily concerned with a 
static sorting equilibrium and not in equilibrium adjustments to income growth or other 
disturbances to the system.  In our paper, we analyze the adjustment of the sorting 
equilibrium to income growth where amenities are endogenous because they depend on 
the level of lakefront development and thus the locational choices of agents.  
In the following section we present evidence of lakefront sorting based on survey 
findings from Vilas County, Wisconsin.  In section 3 we develop an analytical framework 
to analyze the sorting of heterogeneous individuals across a lake system with income 
growth.  The possibility that zoning operates as a signal for sorting is also introduced in 
section 3.  In section 4 we develop a simulation model to explore potential general 
equilibrium adjustments to zoning policies and income growth, with a focus on the 
  4welfare impacts of environmental zoning. In section 5 we discuss the results and offer 
some concluding remarks. 
2. Survey evidence of sorting and environmental zoning 
  Evidence of agent sorting across a lake system comes from a recent survey of 
lakeshore property owners in Vilas County, Wisconsin. Vilas County is located in the 
northeast corner of the state. Northeastern Wisconsin is a prime regional vacation 
destination, in part because it is heavily forested, and in part because it has the highest 
concentration of freshwater lakes in the world. Nearly 60% of the housing stock in Vilas 
County is seasonal; this proportion is about 70% for lakeshore properties.  
  The past 50 years have seen significant lakeshore development and a concomitant 
fragmentation of lakeshore riparian zones. The State of Wisconsin adopted lakeshore 
development ordinances in 1965, with the major restriction affecting development 
density being a minimum frontage requirement (MFR) of 100 feet. Over the years, 7 of 
Vilas County’s 14 towns have adopted the stricter MFR of 200 feet, beginning with the 
town of Presque Isle in 1959. 
  Concerned about the impact on lake ecosystems of the rapid rate of lakeshore 
development, in 1997 the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources developed a grant 
program to encourage the state’s counties to develop “lake classifications”, whereby 
lakes are classified according to the sensitivity of their ecosystems to development, and 
ordinances restricting lakeshore development are written accordingly. The VCLC was 
passed into law in 1999. It classifies lakes according to their ecological sensitivity (three 
levels, low medium and high) and level of development as of 1999 (three levels, low 
medium and high). The result is that every lake in the county falls in a cell of a 3x3 
  5matrix of development and ecological sensitivity, with MFRs customized to each cell. 
The MFR is strictest for relatively undeveloped, ecologically sensitive lakes. 
  The survey of Vilas County lakeshore property owners was conducted in June 
2005, 3300 randomly-selected lakeshore property owners were contacted with the request 
that they complete an Internet survey concerning their lakeshore property. The survey 
included a large variety of questions concerning lake recreation activities, knowledge of 
lake ecology, expectations about future development, and willingness to pay to prevent 
addition development. A follow-up mail survey was sent in January 2006 to every 
member of the original sample who did not respond to the Internet survey. The overall 
response rate was 52%.   
  The survey results indicate that people are indeed sorting across Vilas county 
lakes, and suggest that agents are responding to lakeshore zoning restrictions, either 
directly, by calculating (in a loose sense) that a lake’s future state of development 
depends on current development restrictions (as specified in the VCLC), or indirectly, as 
reflected by the finding that lakes that are relatively undeveloped because of their long 
period of protection under strict town ordinances are settled by a different type of 
lakeshore property owner than those lakes in towns that through the years remained under 
weaker state ordinances until the adoption of the VCLC in 1999.  
  Figures 1 makes this point. The figure is drawn from the following question on 
the survey: 
“If you could make no more than three changes to your lake from the 
following list, to make your lake more like what you consider the 
“ideal” lake, which would you choose?” 
 
  6The list included 18 possible changes, ranging from “make my lake bigger” to “make my 
lake quieter –fewer motor boats and jet skiis”. Figure 1 reports the proportion of 
respondents in each of four categories who included among their three changes, “Reduce 
the amount of development on my lake”. The categories distinguish respondents who 
bought their properties in 1999 or later (recall that the VCLC was adopted in 1999) from 
those who bought their properties before 1999, and distinguishes between those 
respondents on lakes with an MFR of 150 feet and those on lakes with an MFR of 300 
feet. Keeping in mind that under the lake classification the MFR decreases with 
development density (so that the MFR is less strict on more heavily developed lakes), the 
figure reveals strong heterogeneity with respect to preferences over lakeshore 
development: respondents on relatively undeveloped lakes are actually more likely to 
identify reduced development as one of the changes they would most like to make on 
their lake. The figure also suggests that the VCLC is directly affecting this sorting: the 
disparity in responses between respondents on lakes with MFRs of 150 feet vs. 300 feet is 
greater after the VCLC was imposed. That is, although the sorting across lake 
development levels is generally evident in the data, it is strongest for recent purchasers. 
Similar sorting results are apparent throughout the survey. For instance, individuals on 
highly developed, relatively unrestricted lakes are more likely to participate in 
waterskiing and jet skiing. 
3. Analytic model of lakefront sorting 
In this paper we assume that people’s choice of lakefront property depends on the 
amount of frontage they can purchase and the amount of amenities present on the lake.  
Development along a lake impacts the amenity flow to each parcel and we assume that 
  7the amenity flow is decreasing in the density of lakeshore development.  Therefore, each 
landowner on the lake contributes to the lake specific public good—amenities—but is not 
compensated for their specific contribution to the public good.  
3.1 Static model 
Suppose there are J lakes on the lake system, each with fixed boundaries.  Further, 
suppose a lake provides a level of amenity A, and the price of shoreline frontage on the 
lake is P.  Amenities and prices are endogenous to development.  For simplicity, we 
assume that each individual on a lake consumes frontage level f, and a composite private 
good b.  Households differ in income, y, and in a taste parameter, α, which defines the 
household’s valuation of the lake-specific amenity.  The continuum of households is 
described by the joint distribution of y and α, according to the density f(y, α).  Each 
household is assumed to solve the following problem: 
 
, max ( , , , ) . .
fb UA f b s t P f y b α = −         ( 1 )  
Alternatively, the preferences of a household can be described by the indirect utility 
function derived by solving (1): 
(,,,) (,,(,,,) , (,,,) ) V APy U Af APy y P f APy α αα α =−            (2) 
Since households prefer higher levels of amenities and lower prices, there is an indirect 






dP V A P y A
MA P y








>      (3) 
M() is assumed to be monotonically increasing in α and y, which implies that indifference 
curves in the (A, P) plane satisfy the single crossing property in α (Epple and Sieg 1999), 











> , and agents with high levels of α are willing-to-pay 
more for a given increment in A (Cooper 1984). 
 Let  (Ai, Pi) and (Aj, Pj) be the level of amenities and frontage price on lakes i and 
j, and suppose that some individuals prefer (Ai, Pi) and others prefer (Aj, Pj).  Then the set 
of individuals indifferent between the two lakes is given by (α, y) such that 
  (, , ,) (, ,,) jj i i VA P y VA P y α α =        ( 4 )  
Epple and Platt (1998) show if M() is monotonic in y and α, then (4) implicitly defines a 
monotonic function α(y) satisfying indifference between (Ai, Pi) and (Aj, Pj).  We assume 
an equilibrium exists
3 and present necessary conditions that hold in equilibrium for lakes 
that differ in amenities and, hence, differ in frontage prices and the characteristics (y and 
α ) of inhabitants. 
Proposition 1/ This proposition is adapted from Epple and Sieg (1999). Consider an 
equilibrium allocation in which no two lakes have the same frontage prices.  For such an 
allocation to be a spatial equilibrium, there must be an ordering of lake pairs, {(A1, P1), 
(A2, P2),….,(AJ, PJ)}, such that the following holds: 
1)  Boundary Indifference: individuals on the boundary of two adjacent lakes are 
indifferent between the two and are characterized by the set:   
   { } 11 ( , )| ( , , ) ( , , , ) , 0,1,..., jj j j j I yV AP y V A P y j J αα α ++ == ∀ =
                                                
   (5) 
 where  (A0, P0) and (AJ+1, PJ+1) indicate off-lake systems. 
 
3 Epple and Platt (1998) found that equilibrium exists in computational examples in a model with both 
income and preference heterogeneity.  Epple et al. (1993) provide a rigorous proof of existence in a model 
with just income heterogeneity. 
  92)  Sorting: Let αj(y) be the implicit function defined by (4). Then, for each y, the 
residents of lake j consist of those with preferences α, given by 
1() () j y j y α αα − <<         ( 6 )  
3)  Increasing bundles: Consider two lakes i and j such that Pi>Pj. Then Ai>Aj if and 
only if αi(y) > αj(y). 
Proof/ See appendix. 
Proposition 2 presents conditions for the sorting equilibrium when residents have a 
continuous distribution of income and amenity preferences.  If all individuals have an 
identical income, then the sorting occurs by preferences alone, where individuals with 
high α reside on high-amenity, high-price lakes.  If individuals differ by income and 
preferences, several lakes may have residents of a given preference, so that lakes are not 
perfectly sorted by preferences alone.  Instead, the sorting equilibrium is represented by 
layered “slices” of the joint distribution of y and α where each slice encompasses the 
population on a given lake.  
The “slice” representing the sorting equilibrium is shown in Figure 2, where for 
simplicity we aggregate across lakes to show the slice of the population on the entire lake 
system. The slice could be horizontal or vertical to the amenity axis, or the slice could be 
somewhere in between—as in Figure 2. The upper boundary is represented by the set of 
agents indifferent between the highest-amenity, highest-priced lake on the system, and 
the bundle of amenities and prices on an alternate off-lake system: 
{ } 11 (,) |(, , ,) (, , ,) JJ J J J I yV APy V A P y αα α ++ == , where AJ+1>AJ and PJ+1>PJ.  The 
exogenous alternate system (hereafter referred to as the high off-lake alternative) could 
represent a separate lake system that is more pristine and expensive to visit, or it could 
  10represent some other location with a high level of amenities and high prices (e.g. a beach-
front hut on a tropical island).  Likewise, the lower boundary is represented by the set of 
agents who are indifferent between the lowest-amenity, lowest-priced lake on the system, 
and being off the system entirely:  { } 11 1 0 (,) |(, , ,) (, , ,) 0 I yV A P y V APy αα α ==  where 
A0<A1 and P0<P1.  The bundle (A0, P0) refers to the amenity and price pair on the system 
hereafter referred to as the low off-lake alternative. 
An important difference between this model and that of Epple and Sieg (1999) is 
that this model concerns only the subset of the population residing on the lake system.  
This makes the model somewhat akin to an open-city model where agents can reside in 
alternate cities (e.g. Brueckner 1990).  However, utility varies across individuals in our 
model rather than always equilibrating to some exogenous constant level as in traditional 
open-city models. 
A primary feature of the sorting equilibrium in proposition 1 is that lakes are 
differentiated by amenities and prices, such that higher amenity lakes have higher prices.  
The slice of the population on the lake system (figure 2) consists of J layered slices 
corresponding to the J lakes on the system.  The highest amenity lake on the system is 
comprised of a population with higher amenity preferences and/or higher incomes than 
the population on any of the lower amenity lakes.  
3.2 The effect of income growth on lakefront sorting 
In the absence of growth controls, development proceeds over time in response to 
changes in private benefits and costs. Given that not all benefits and costs are 
incorporated in the development decision, and development is quasi-irreversible, the 
development state at any point in time reflects an accumulation of inefficient decisions. 
  11Zoning is a fairly blunt means of incorporating social benefits and costs in the 
development process, but its effect is sharpened by the opportunity for heterogeneous 
agents to sort themselves into the zones (lakes) they prefer. In effect, non-uniform zoning 
implicitly recognizes the heterogeneity of preferences in the population, but relies on the 
market to determine who ends up in which zone.  
To set the stage for understanding the effects of environmental zoning, we first 
examine analytically the effect of income growth on development and sorting equilibria 
in the absence of zoning. We use income growth as the driver for development because 
this is likely one of the primary forces underlying lakeshore development. Suppose there 
is an income shock which shifts the distribution of income upwards but doesn’t shift the 
distribution of tastes: formally, f(α, y) shifts to f ’(α, y).  The number of people on the lake 
system before the shock is defined by (,)
y
y
f yd y d
α
α
α α ∫∫ , and the population with these 
same preferences and incomes after the shock is assumed to be larger than before the 
shock:  '( , ) ( , )
yy
yy
f yd y d f yd y d
αα
αα
α αα > ∫∫ ∫∫ α .  Proposition 2 describes the new sorting 
equilibrium after the shock. 
Proposition 2: A positive income shock, such that '( , ) ( , )
yy
yy
f yd y d f yd y d
αα
αα
α αα > ∫∫ ∫∫ α , 
will result in a new sorting equilibrium with the following characteristics: 
1.  A more homogeneous population, with the boundary lakes defined by: 
  { } 11 1 0 (' ,' ) |(' , ' , ' ,' ) (' , ,,' ) 0 I yV A P y V A P y αα α ==  where (' ,' )(,) yy α α >  
{ } ( ', ') | ( ', ', ', ') ( ', , , ') JJ J J I yV APy V A P y αα α ==  where (' ,' )(,) yy α α <  
  122.  The price premium between the highest amenity lake and the lowest amenity lake will 
be less than before the shock:  11 '' JJ PPPP − <− . 
3.  Amenity levels on each lake are no higher than before: Aj’≤Aj for all j.  
Proof/ see appendix. 
Proposition 2 states that the new sorting equilibrium results in a lake system which has a 
more homogeneous population and a lower price premium between lakes.  The intuition 
for the increased homogeneity of the population is the following.  The increase in income 
serves to increase the demand for lake frontage. With reference to Figure 1, the frequency 
distribution of the population shifts up in the y-dimension, so that the population mass 
covering the original slice of the lake system in  y α −  space is greater. This bids up the 
price of frontage. At the same time, because development is irreversible, the level of 
amenities on each lake cannot increase, and more typically decrease. Keeping in mind 
that lakes are defined by their amenities and prices, it follows that lakes in the system are 
necessarily less attractive after incomes rise. Consequently, individuals originally at the 
upper boundary of the lake system,( ) , y α , prefer to move up to the high off-lake 
alternative, and individuals at the lower boundary, ( ) , y α , prefer to move down to the 
low off-lake alternative. The result is that even as the income shock increases the number 
of individuals on the lake system, the “slice” of the population on the lake system is 
thinner –that is, the population on the lake system is more homogeneous.  
The intuition for the decrease in the price premium associated with a high amenity 
lake follows immediately from the increasing homogeneity of the lake population. The 
price premium for high-amenity lakes depends on both heterogeneity of development on 
the lakes, and heterogeneity in the population residing on the lake system. As the 
  13population becomes more homogeneous, competitive pressures assure that prices become 
more homogeneous as well; quite simply, there is less pressure to bid up the price of 
high-amenity lakes when the difference between the most and least amenity-loving 
agents on the lake system is relatively small.  While a collapsing price premium seems to 
intuitively imply a faster rate of development on higher amenity lakes relative to lower 
amenity lakes, our derivation of the collapsing price premium arises from the increasing 
homogeneity of the lake population.  It is possible for a collapsing price premium to 
occur concurrent with unchanging lakefront amenity levels, or with lakefront amenity 
levels which decline as incomes grow.  The ultimate effect of income growth on amenity 
levels depends on the general equilibrium adjustment process used to sort residents across 
lakes.  Simulation methods are used below to explore such adjustment. 
3.3 Environmental zoning and the sorting equilibrium with rising incomes 
  Environmental zoning on lake shorelines typically involves restrictions on the 
amount of frontage individuals may own –so-called minimum frontage restrictions 
(MFRs).  Such restrictions are aimed at increasing the flow of environmental goods and 
services on lakes by reducing the number of properties allowed to develop along the 
shoreline.  These goods and services –the amenity of our formal model –are not pure 
private goods. The decision to subdivide a parcel reduces the flow of these goods and 
services to all agents on the lake, yet this cost is not borne by the decision maker. 
Lakeshore zoning is one way to correct this inefficiency. Papenfus and Provencher 
(2005) show that MFRs can either increase or decrease aggregate welfare. Importantly, 
they assumed a homogenous population, and so the optimal MFR is uniform. Yet the 
typical zoning ordinance is not uniform –the Vilas county Lake Classification is no 
  14exception –and in general preferences are not heterogeneous. This leads to the question, 
What are the consequences of heterogeneous zoning in a world of heterogeneous agents? 
Consider, for instance, the following example. Suppose there is a system of two 
lakes (J=2) where P1<P2 and A1<A2.  Further, suppose incomes rise resulting in new 
prices (P’) and amenity levels (A’), where Pj’>Pj and Aj’<Aj for j=1,2. In adjusting to the 
new equilibrium, some people who chose Lake 2 prior to the income shock will be better 
off moving to the high off-lake alternative. In addition, some people who chose Lake 1 
prior to the income shock will move to Lake 2, and some people on the low off-lake 
alternative may move onto Lake 1.  This process will result in a collapsing price premium 
and a more homogeneous population between the two lakes.  Now suppose Lake 2, and 
only Lake 2, was zoned such that no additional development could occur, in which case 
A2’=A2.  Under such a zoning policy, we’d expect the following consequences: some 
people may remain on Lake 2 rather than move to the high off-lake alternative; some 
people may stay on Lake 1 rather than move to Lake 2; some people may stay on the low 
off-lake alternative rather than move to Lake 1; and Lake 1 amenity levels may be lower 
if more people locate on Lake 1.  The ultimate effects of zoning on welfare would consist 
of the following: a loss of utility to some residents for not being able to locate on the lake 
of their choosing, a potential gain in utility for some residents of Lake 2 for the higher 
amenity levels, and a gain in land rent resulting from higher frontage prices on the two 
lakes.  To explore this example more thoroughly, we move to simulation methods to 
investigate the impacts of zoning. 
  154. Simulation model of lakefront sorting with environmental zoning 
4.1 Simulation model design and sorting equilibrium 
In this section we develop a simulation model of lakefront zoning with a parameterized 
utility function to demonstrate the possibility of the following outcomes: a) zoning can be 
welfare increasing; b) zoning preserves heterogeneity, not only directly by limiting 
development on some lakes, but also indirectly by providing an institutional constraint 
conducive to the sorting process; and c) in the absence of zoning, income growth can lead 
to a faster rate of development on lakes that initially have lower development densities—
and higher amenities—than lakes that initially have higher development densities.  
The simulation model is based on a system of two lakes—a low amenity lake 
(Lake 1) and a high amenity lake (Lake 2) —as well as exogenous “low” and “high” off-
lake alternatives, where the low alternative (indexed by the subscript “0”) has a low 
frontage price and amenity level, and the high alternative (indexed by the subscript “3”) 
has a high frontage price and amenity level. The simulation derives the equilibrium 
location choice among these four alternatives for each member of a population of 20,000 
residents, with each resident defined by a pair{ } , y α .  The population was drawn from a 
bivariate normal distribution of α  and  with zero correlation. Zero correlation implies 
that high-income individuals are no more likely to have high amenity preferences than 
low-income individuals.   
y
We adopt the utility specification used by Epple and Sieg (1999) and assume the 
indirect utility function for individual k on lake j is given by 
1/
1 1 1 1
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  16where η<0, α>0, ρ<0, ν>0, and B>0.  For the two lakes of our system, the amenity level 
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where j F  is the shoreline frontage on lake j, j=1,2, Nj is the total number of residents who 
settle on the lake, and  ,0 γ μ > .  
 Resident  k’s demand for frontage on lake j can be derived by appealing to Roy’s 
identity and expressed as 
(,) jjk j k FPy B Py
η ν =         (9) 
From (9) it is apparent that η and ν are the frontage demand elasticities for price and 
income, respectively.  The parameter ρ indicates the strength of the amenity preference, 
and combined with ν, shifts the population slice representing the lakefront residents (e.g. 
figure 2) from parallel to vertical to the amenity preference axis. The appealing aspect of 
this specification is that the slope of an indirect indifference curve in the (A, P) plane is 
positive (Epple and Sieg 1999), thus satisfying the single-crossing properties necessary 
for the sorting equilibrium described above.  Each simulation fixes the utility parameters 
( ,,,, B α ρνη ), amenity function parameters ( , γ μ ), and off-lake frontage prices and 
amenity levels . Conditional on these parameters, an equilibrium is 
obtained in iterative fashion by initially specifying prices,  , j=1,2, and amenity levels 
( 00 33 ,,, PAPA )
j P
j A , j=1,2, for the two system lakes, and determining the location choices made by the 
simulated population conditional on these prices and amenity levels. The choices made 
by individuals generate estimates of amenity levels , j=1,2, and aggregate frontage  ˆ
j A
  17demand, , for each lake of the system j=1,2. The condition for an equilibrium is that 
these estimates of amenities and aggregate frontage demand on the lake system are “close 
enough” to the values initially used to generate choices in the population. Formally, a 
nonlinear gradient algorithm searches over the feasible set of 
ˆ
j F
{ } 1122 ,,, PAPA for values 











+ ∑ < ,         ( 1 0 )  
whereε  is an arbitrarily small positive value.  
In our analysis we derive results for the two sets of parameters presented in Table 
1. These sets generate equilibria with distinctly different “slices” in the  y α −  plane. As 
shown in Figure 3, the first set generates a baseline equilibrium with a relatively high 
amount of α -heterogeneity within lakes, and the second generates a baseline equilibrium 
with a relatively high amount of income heterogeneity within lakes. This is largely due to 
differences in the income elasticity of demand for frontage,ν , which is much higher in 
the second set of parameters than in the first.  The first column of Table 2 provides 
baseline equilibrium results for the two parameter sets. In both equilibria Lake 2 is less 
densely developed
4 than Lake 1 and approximately 26% of the total population resides on 
the two lakes, with most of the remaining population (98%) residing on the low off-lake 
alternative.  The price premium for Lake 2 is 0.80 for parameter set 1 and 0.28 for 
parameter set 2. 
                                                 
4 While the total number of people on Lake 2 exceed the total number on Lake 1, the density of 
development on Lake 2 is lower than Lake 1 because Lake 2 has significantly more frontage than Lake 1. 
  184.2 Simulation experiments 
We conduct three different types of simulation experiments to examine how the 
system departs from the baseline equilibrium under different scenarios involving income 
growth and environmental zoning.  In the simulations, zoning is represented by a 
constraint on the number of individuals allowed on one or both lakes of the system. In the 
first experiment, we investigate the welfare impact of “marginal” zoning –that is, a 
marginal reduction in the population on the high amenity lake (Lake 2).  Since lakefront 
development reduces lake amenities (see equ. 8), an individual’s decision to develop can 
affect the utility of all other lakefront residents—an effect external to the market. 
Therefore, marginal zoning should increase aggregate welfare.  In the second experiment, 
we investigate the impact of income growth on the sorting equilibrium to verify the 
analytical results in section 3 and to examine the possible adjustment of lakefront 
amenities to income growth, an effect which was ambiguous in section 3. In the third 
experiment, we investigate the impact of income growth in the presence of environmental 
zoning, by fixing the number of residents on Lake 2 at the level obtained at the baseline 
sorting equilibrium and then letting income grow.  
4.2.1 Experiment 1: Marginal zoning without income growth 
  In this experiment we keep income constant and impose two marginal zoning 
policies that reduce the number of residents on Lake 2 from the baseline equilibrium by 
about 0.7% (zoning-1) and 1.4% (zoning-2). Results are presented in Tables 2 and 3 for 
both sets of parameters, under the columns labeled “zoning-1” and “zoning-2”.   For both 
sets of parameters, prices on both lakes increased, and the price premium on Lake 2 
increased, as the zoning restriction became tighter. The price on Lake 1 increased 
  19because it is a substitute for Lake 2, and so the zoning restrictions on Lake 2 served to 
increase demand for frontage on Lake 1.  
Focusing now on parameter set 1, Table 2 indicates that increasingly strict zoning 
on Lake 2 results in a net movement down the lake system; a small number of individuals 
initially at the high off-lake alternative move down to Lake 2, some individuals from 
Lake 2 move down to Lake 1, and some individuals on Lake 1 move down to the low off-
lake alternative.  Such adjustments to the new equilibrium are spurred by the amenity 
effects from zoning Lake 2, and the simple fact that some people who would have chosen 
Lake 2 without zoning are prevented from settling on the lake under the zoning 
restrictions. Table 3 provides the distribution of resident gainers and losers under zoning. 
Under both zoning restrictions there are many more losers than gainers. All of the original 
residents of Lake 1 must lose; those who stay on the lake face higher prices and lower 
level of amenity, and those who move down to the low off-lake alternative are choosing 
an alternative that was inferior under the baseline equilibrium. All of the residents who 
move down to Lake 1 from Lake 2 must lose, because Lake 1 is now less attractive than 
it was under the baseline equilibrium, and these residents chose not to settle on Lake 1 
under the baseline equilibrium.  Some of the residents who choose to remain on Lake 2 
lose, because the price increase for frontage overwhelms the utility gain from the increase 
in the amenity level. All of the residents who move down from the high off-lake 
alternative must gain, because they are abandoning an alternative for which there is no 
change in utility from the baseline equilibrium.
5  
                                                 
5 We enumerate the winners and losers only for this case, to give the reader a sense of the conceptual logic 
behind distributional impacts of the various simulation scenarios. 
  20Despite the fact that there are many more resident losers than winners, the welfare 
effect of the zoning restrictions are positive, as expected, because the price increase 
presents landlords with a windfall. The first zoning restriction results in a loss of $133 in 
welfare to residents, but landlords gain $243, for a net welfare gain of $110. The second 
zoning restriction generates similar results for a welfare gain of $183.
6
As evident from Table 2, zoning restrictions under parameter set 2 generate a 
more complicated resident shuffling than under parameter set 1.  In this experiment, no 
residents moved from the high off-lake alternative to Lake 2, while some original Lake 2 
residents moved to the high off-lake alternative, and others moved down to Lake 1.  In 
addition, some residents moved from Lake 1 to the low off-lake alternative.  As reported 
in Table 3, the distribution of resident gainers and losers includes no gainers under either 
zoning policy, as the entire original lake population loses welfare under both zoning 
policies.  As with the first parameter set, though, the net effect of the zoning restrictions 
is an increase in welfare, because of the rent increases that accrue to landlords.  
4.2.2 Experiment 2: Sorting equilibrium with income growth 
  In this experiment we investigate the sorting equilibrium adjustment under rising 
incomes.  The first income shock raises everyone’s income by $1000 while the second 
income shock raises everyone’s income by $2000.  This experiment is a direct test of the 
analytical results in section 3.  Results are in Table 2 under the columns labeled “Growth 
Equilibrium 1” and Growth Equilibrium 2”.  Results for the two sets of parameters are 
qualitatively the same, and so here we discuss the results in the context of the first 
parameter set. The population on lakes 1 and 2 becomes more homogenous –that is, the 
                                                 
6 Of course, landlords and residents are often one and the same, and so it is entirely possible that all 
residents end up better off. Nonetheless, distinguishing landlords from residents as we do here serves the 
purpose of providing insights to the nature of gains and losses. 
  21slices in y α −  space defining location choices become narrower as income grows; a 
result predicted analytically.  A second result which was predicted analytically is the 
decline in the price premium between the two lakes; an outcome which falls from 
application of the single-crossing property to the increasingly homogeneous lake 
population. A third result which was analytically ambiguous is the effect of income 
growth on the amenity levels for the two lakes.  For the two sets of parameters used in the 
simulation model, Lake 2 gains residents and loses amenities as income grows, while the 
number of residents and the amenity level on Lake 1 remains unchanged.  So, the 
simulation results demonstrate the intuitive but analytically ambiguous possibility that 
higher amenity lakes will develop relatively quicker than low amenity lakes when 
incomes are growing. 
4.2.3 Experiment 3: Zoning with income growth 
   In this experiment we use the same income growth as above, but the zoning 
policy restricts development on Lake 2 to its pre-growth level, so that the zoning 
restriction is essentially a development moratorium. Results for both parameter sets are in 
Table 2 under the columns labeled “Zoning with Growth 1” and “Zoning with Growth 2”.     
The first parameter set generates the result that development on Lake 1 increases slightly 
as income increases, though there is a considerable amount of movement across 
locations; in particular, residents move down a level (e.g. from Lake 2 to Lake 1), but not 
up (e.g. from Lake 1 to Lake 2).
7 Curiously, the population of gainers under the first 
income increase is substantially greater than under income growth 2 (Table 3), as 70% of 
                                                 
7 This “downward flow” in location choice due to zoning was also found for parameter set 1 in the first 
experiment, but is not found for parameter set 2. The explanation for this is complicated by the fact that the 
amenity function differs across the two parameter sets, in addition to the income elasticity of frontage 
demand.       
  22the pre-zoning population of Lake 2 gains welfare under zoning with the first income 
increase, while only 5% gain welfare under zoning with the second increase. Nonetheless 
it remains true that in the aggregate the development moratorium is costly to residents, 
and becomes more costly as income grows (net consumer loss is $1 after the first income 
shock and $68 under the second shock), though, due to rent increases, the net social 
welfare effect of the moratorium is positive, and increasing with income (the aggregate 
welfare change is +$11 after the first income shock, and +$68 after the second shock).   
 Under the second parameter set there is virtually no new development as incomes 
rise, though once again there is a considerable amount of movement across locations, and 
this time these changes in location are not unidirectional.  As found in the first 
experiment, no residents moved from the high-off-lake to Lake 2, while some original 
residents of Lake 2 move to the high off-lake alternative and others moved to Lake 1.  In 
addition, some residents moved from Lake 1 to the low off-lake alternative.  The 
development moratorium leaves all residents worse off as income grows, though once 
again this loss is sufficiently compensated by an increase in land rents that aggregate 
social welfare increases as income grows.  
5.  Conclusion 
In this paper we demonstrate that heterogeneous agents can sort themselves across 
lakes where amenities differ and are endogenous to development.  However, lakefront 
amenities are provided by individual frontage decisions and have public good 
characteristics that will be underprovided in the market equilibrium.  Therefore, 
environmental zoning, in which development is restricted in terms of development 
density, can be welfare improving by forcing individuals to consume more of the private 
  23good—frontage.  Our simulation findings support the contention that zoning can be 
welfare improving, although the majority of residents tend to lose welfare while 
landowners gain welfare through increasing land prices.   
Rising incomes affect the sorting equilibrium by making lakes more 
homogeneous with a reduced price premium between high and low amenity lakes.  This 
result arises because i) increasing incomes make the lake system more attractive to the 
mass of individuals with average amenity preferences and average incomes, ii) land 
prices rise due to excess demand, and iii) lakefront amenities cannot increase because of 
the quasi-irreversible nature of development.  So, the combination of rising land prices 
without a corresponding amenity gain causes residents who were just indifferent between 
the lake system and either alternate system to prefer an alternate system.  In the 
simulation model we verify the increasing homogeneity of the lake system, but we also 
find that there exists a situation where the high amenity lake develops faster than the low 
amenity lake as incomes rise.  So, it is possible for the sorting mechanism to break down 
over time, which has implications for lakes where ecological functions are negatively 
impacted by shoreline development.
8  In particular, the biological diversity across lakes 
can potentially be diminished as previously pristine lakes develop and become more 
similar to lakes that were already heavily developed.  Therefore, our findings indicate 
that one role for environmental zoning is to preserve the sorting process and maintain 
heterogeneity across lakes. 
This paper’s findings regarding the welfare effects of zoning has implications for 
hedonic analyses of land prices and environmental zoning (e.g. Spalatro and Provencher 
                                                 
8 Ecological studies have shown that increased shoreline development results in lower levels of coarse 
woody debris (e.g. downed trees) which provide important habitat for fish production (Christensen et al. 
1997). 
  242001; Netusil 2005).  In particular, there may be welfare effects from environmental 
zoning that are not captured by land prices, primarily because many original lakefront 
residents—as opposed to landlords—can potentially have their utility diminished by 
environmental zoning.
9  In particular, zoning the high amenity lake not only affects the 
utility of residents on that lake, but it also affects the utility of residents on other lakes 
through resident movement as the sorting equilibrium adjusts.  Our results indicate that it 
is a mistake to consider only land prices in the calculation of the welfare effects of 
environmental zoning.  For non-marginal changes, an aggregate social welfare measure 
should include the compensating variation of residents whose utility is altered by zoning.  
Future iterations of this paper intend to explore the possibility of finding increasing land 
prices which correspond with lower total welfare. 
 
                                                 
9 This result is consistent with Bartik’s (1988) analysis of the welfare impacts of exogenous amenity 
changes with hedonic price models. 
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  29Figure 3. Initial equilibria 
3.a Parameter set 1 
 
3.b Parameter set 2 
 
  30Table 1: Simulation Parameters 
    Parameter set 1  Parameter set 2 
Parameters v  0.60 0.95
  η -0.50 -0.50
  ρ -0.75 -0.75
 B  0.43 0.43
  γ 1397.13 1.14
  μ 2.19 8.43
Amenities Low  Off-Lake  10 10
 High  Off-Lake  500 2000
Price Low  Off-Lake  50 50
 High  Off-Lake  155 64
Frontage Lake  2  1136.85 5261.28
 Lake  1  848.55 4856.09
  31Table 2: Simulation Results  
   Initial 
equilibrium 












Parameter Set 1     
Amenities Lake  2  175.00  177.64 180.33  174.66  172.30  175.00 175.00 
 Lake  1  150.00  149.75  148.20 150.01  149.89 149.99  148.34 
Price Lake  2  147.45  147.61  147.75 148.54  149.12 148.55  149.25 
 Lake  1  146.65  146.72  146.73 147.76  148.41 147.76  148.40 
Price Premium  P2-P1  0.80  0.88 1.01  0.79  0.72  0.80 0.85 
# of Residents  High Off-Lake  291  289  287  636  1078  635  1076 
  Lake  2  2938 2917  2898 2942  2960 2938  2938 
  Lake  1  2353 2353  2366 2353  2353 2358  2365 
  Low  Off-Lake  14418 14441  14449 14069  13609 14069  13621 
Objective Function  0.0000  0.0097 0.0198  0.0085  0.0091  0.0155 0.0205 
Welfare  Lake 2 Rent  $167,629  $167,808 $167,968 $168,870 $169,533  $168,883 $169,677
  Lake 1 Rent  $124,440  $124,503 $124,510 $125,378 $125,929  $125,379 $125,924
 Compensating 
Variation 
 -$133  -$226     -$1  -$70 
 Total  Change    $110  $183      $11  $68 
Parameter Set 2        
Amenities Lake  2  1000.00  1059.18  1122.30 982.00  970.72 1000.00  1000.00 
 Lake  1  500.00  497.50  497.50 500.00  500.09 500.00  500.09 
Price Lake  2  63.78  63.80  63.83 63.79  63.79 63.80  63.80 
 Lake  1  63.50  63.50  63.51 63.52  63.53 63.52  63.53 
Price Premium  P2-P1  0.28  0.30 0.32  0.27  0.27  0.28 0.28 
# of Residents  High Off-Lake  260  264  280  631  1039  633  1042 
  Lake  2  2353 2337  2321 2358  2361 2353  2353 
  Lake  1  2358 2358  2350 2358  2358 2358  2359 
  Low  Off-Lake  15029 15041  15049 14653  14242 14656  14246 
Objective Function    0.0000  0.0124 0.0505  0.0104  0.0213  0.0122 0.0236 
Welfare  Lake 2 Rent  $335,564  $335,686 $335,806 $335,612 $335,634  $335,648 $335,692
  Lake 1 Rent  $308,361  $308,376 $308,406 $308,440 $308,488  $308,446 $308,497
 Compensating   
Variation 
 -$46  -$99    -$11  -$15 
  Total  Change   $90  $188     $32  $52 
 
  32Table 3 Resident Gainers and Losers 
Baseline lake 
choice 






Parameter Set 1    
High  off-lake  Gainers  2 4 1 2 
  Losers  0 0 0 0 
Lake 2  Gainers  109  177  2045  141 
 Losers  2829  2761  897  2819 
Lake  1  Gainers  0 0 0 0 
  Losers  2353 2353 2353 2353 
Low  off-lake  Gainers  0 0 0 0 
  Losers  0 0 0 0 
Parameter Set 2    
High  off-lake  Gainers  0 0 0 0 
  Losers  0 0 0 0 
Lake  2  Gainers  0 0 0 0 
  Losers  2353 2353 2358 2361 
Lake  1  Gainers  0 0 0 0 
  Losers  2358 2358 2358 2358 
Low  off-lake  Gainers  0 0 0 0 
  Losers  0 0 0 0 
 
  33Proofs 
Proof of proposition 1:  This proof is adapted from Epple and Platt (1998).  Begin by 
ordering lakes by increasing amenities, AJ>AJ-1>….>A2>A1.  Since V() is increasing in A 
and decreasing in p, equilibrium prices must satisfy pJ>pJ-1>….>p2>p1.  To prove 1), note 
that boundary indifference follows directly from the continuity of V() and the continuum 
of agents.  To show parts 2 and 3, fix y.  Boundary indifference implies that a household 
(αj-1(y), y) is indifferent between (Aj-1, pj-1) and (Aj, pj).  The single-crossing property 
implies the following:  
For α > αj-1(y) (e.g. α in fig. A1) => (Aj, pj)   (A f i, pi) for all i<j, 
For α < αj(y) (e.g. α in fig. A1) => (Aj, pj)  (A f i, pi) for all i>j. 












  34Proof of proposition 2: Given that '( , ) ( , )
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f yd y d f yd y d
αα
αα
α αα > ∫∫ ∫∫ α , one of three things 
must happen to restore equilibrium. Either prices have to rise, there has to be more 
building (and fewer amenities), or there has to be a combination of building and 
increasing prices.   
a.  If equilibrium is restored by more building, then amenities fall on every lake 
and people who were originally indifferent at the border lakes—those 
described by either(,) y α  or(,) y α -- will be better off either on no lake or on 
the alternative system.  Therefore, the lake system must become more 
homogeneous. 
b.  If equilibrium is restored by a price increase alone, then either 
(' ,' )(,) y y α α > , (' ,' )(,) yy α α < , or both. We show that either of the first 
two options alone leads to a contradiction. 
i.  If (' ,' )(,) y y α α =  and (' ,' )(,) y y α α <  then A1’=A1 and p1’=p1 to 
maintain border indifference. However, this implies pJ’-p1’>pJ-p1, 
which violates the single-crossing property. 
ii.  If (' ,' )(,) y y α α >  and (' ,' )(,) y y α α =  then AJ’=AJ and pJ’=pJ to 
maintain border indifference.  But, if (' ,' )(,) y y α α > , then every 
'( ) ( ) jj y y α α >  to fit everyone onto each lake without building.  
Therefore, '( ) ( ) JJ y y α α >  and pJ’>pJ by the single-crossing property. 
This is a contradiction. 
2.  Since (' ,' )(,) y y α α >  and(' ,' )(,) yy α α < , then pJ’-p1’<pJ-p1 by the single-crossing 
property. 
3.  Amenities cannot increase because lakefront development is defined as irreversible. 
  35